The big bad asses

[Safarigent]

I have been reading notes on a website for a while. Its called badassoftheweek.com
The man who is writing accounts of , well 'badass' warriors has a flair for hilarity.
Do read and enjoy. Also i think one of the photos is xltargets daughter here
http://badassoftheweek.com/kauser.html


Enjoy the website

[dr.jayakumar]

laughed while reading.thanks Safarigent.

[Safarigent]

Its good fun and good knowledge too.
Which one was your favourite?

[xl_target]

LOL. Good one there AB.
...and, LOL, no, that blue eyed lass behind the AK is not my daughter.


My baby girl has brown eyes
(photo by Oleg)

There are several Indians and Nepali's on that list. Check it out.
Dipprasad Pun
Yogender Singh Yadav
Bishnu Shershta
Lachhiman Gurung
Mai Bhago

[Safarigent]

oops.....sorry about that.
i saw olegs name and put two plus two, turns out i added that upto 3.5.
i have read almost all of the posts(slept quite quite late) and i couldnt decide half the time whether to laugh hysterically or just kill myself at the sheer batsh*t insane acts of these supermen and women!!!!!!



p.s. i think your 'baby' girl is stronger than me!

[Safarigent]

Please read this latest article.
Being a mild history buff i never had an idea of this battle!
What glory! What bravery! Their nation was blessed to have such men as its children!

http://www.badassoftheweek.com/index.cgi?id=52657811114

[timmy]

That is quite a story, no doubt about it! It is in line with the attack of Lt Cdr Waldron's torpedo bombers on the Japanese carriers at Midway, Captain Edward Kennedy and HMS Rawalpindi taking on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to save his convoy, and the attempt by HMS Acasta and HMS Ardent to save HMS Glorious from Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the Atlantic.

As you read more about Leyte Gulf, pay attention to how Halsey and Kinkaid handled the problem of how a fleet supports a landing and also deals with an apposing fleet at the same time. Previous lessons were Nagumo's failure at Midway and Spruance's success at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. You'll start to form your own opinions of what's what after a few books, a most enjoyable process!

PS: USS Johnson is more like 1500 tons displacement, not 15,000!

[Safarigent]

Thanks timmy.
Any good books you'd that come to mind?
I somehow would still trust a book with an author than unknown faces tapping away on wikipedia.
Thanks,
A

[timmy]

I have not read the best books on these battles! Samuel Eliot Morison wrote the official Navy account of Leyte Gulf and Midway, but his work is biased and sometimes not accurate. That said, I can't tell you how many renditions of these accounts I've read, because they would be many. The thing about some of these stories is that, even if they were written by a master, like Barbara Tuchman or William Manchester, the stories themselves are so incredible and amazing, it is hard to add to them.

I was hooked on them in, I believe, 1967, 25 years after Midway. I was a kid and we were visiting people in Wyoming. It was a very boring thing and on the coffee table, there was a Life Magazine with a huge article about Midway. I read the whole thing because it was so riveting.

i would consider these following books to be the "High Price Spread" when it comes to the Pacific War, but I have yet to read them:

The First Team: Pacific Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway by John B. Lundstrom
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal by John B. Lundstrom
The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 by John B. Lundstrom
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully

Gordon Prange's works are interesting, but I can't say I care for them.

I can tell you that, about Leyte Gulf, you can try Morison, as the stories are so good, you won't put it down. But for the analysis of decisions by the Japanese and Americans, I can't tell you anything that I've read that stands out. I've read the stuff so many times over the years, and there are really 4 main phases to Leyte Gulf: The part where Halsey's carrier aircraft sink Musashi in the San Bernardino Strait, the part where Kinkaid's 7th Fleet destroys Nishimura in Leyte Gulf proper, Halsey's taking Ozawa's bait, and Sprague's fight with Kurita.

Kurita's breaking through to the landing forces on Leyte would have set the American advance back for quite some time, but the end was still inevitable for Japan. Perhaps Kurita getting cold feet and the atom bomb was best, otherwise Japan could have been divided like Germany and Korea.

[xl_target]

American's (and yes, the rest of the world) take US Navy carrier operations for granted today but at the time, the tenets of air ops at sea were still being formulated. The baby (or escort) carriers were especially hard to take off from and land on. The had limited deck space and a limited number of aircraft. It is amazing the US Navy was able to implement carrier operations so successfully in WW2. By the end of the war, Carrier operations resembled very much what is done today. Every take off and landing back then was fraught with danger and it is amazing what those 19 and 20 year old pilots accomplished.

Kurita's main goal was to disrupt the landings on Leyte but it seems when he saw the sixteen escort carriers, he lost his head and went after them. The landings went practically unopposed and the rest is history. The battle of Leyte Gulf consists of four separate engagements: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar. The result of the series of engagements was basically the end of the Imperial Japanese Navy as a cohesive fighting force.


Shattered Sword is considered the definitive account of Midway today.
It is among the latest in a long line of books about Midway.

There is also a 1955 book called "Midway" by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya that is fascinating. It is written from the Japanese Navy's point of view. Fuchida was the commander of the air unit on Akagi. Okumiya served with the Northern Diversionary Force that made the landing in the Aleutians. Sadly it is now out of print. I think this is a must-read because almost every other book is written from the American perspective. Shattered Sword claims to correct "the many errors of Fucida's Midway" but keep in mind that Fuchida and Okumiya were actually there. If you read Fuchida's Midway, you will see the series of errors and blunders committed by the IJN. It is easier to understand what happened at Leyte Gulf because they continue to make similar errors in coordination, communication and execution. No one can ever say that the individual Japanese soldiers, sailors or airman were not brave but it takes more than mere bravery to win battles against an enemy who fights as a cohesive team. Even though the American Navy split its forces during Leyte Gulf, the US Naval forces that were at each battle fought as a team instead of individually.

If you want to read about the Battle of Leyte Gulf, here are two excellent books.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf by Edwin P Hoyt
Afternoon of the Rising Sun by Kenneth I Friedman.
Rising Sun is a more enjoyable read.

[timmy]

XL, correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think that Kurita actually saw all of the "Taffy" escort carriers. One group of them was too far south to be seen.

As I understand it, even depth charges were being dropped on Kurita's ships -- any weapon available was used.

Kurita's error was that, when he saw Sprague's Taffy 3, he ordered a general chase, and effectively lost control of the battle. Such a lesson could/should have been learned from Beatty's battlecruiser action at Dogger Bank during WW1. Ozawa's bait had been taken; Kurita didn't know that part, and one might mistake the Taffy "jeep carriers" for the main USN strike force, but by this time, the IJN was reduced to grasping at straws -- pressing home the attack may have been his best decision, despite the considerable damage his ships took. After all, even though they were damaged, none were lost in that action.

Carrier operations were perfected by the USN in the Pacific War, and even the British who were attached to the US Fleet at the end were taking lessons from the Americans. The whole business of the Pacific War showed how much the pendulum had swung to the Americans from the RN. The USN's engineering had overtaken British engineering in almost every department, except battleship armor, by the 30s. The RAF, insisting on keeping control of everything that flew, left the RN in the lurch when it came to carrier borne aircraft. The RN was making do with rather small ships and small air groups, where the USN and IJN understood that practical fleet carrier operations required an air group of 72 to 80 aircraft per carrier. British ships were designed to have access to British bases, and weren't intended to operate in the vast expanse of the Pacific, which was part of the USN's plan all along.

Where the USN excelled over the IJN was in damage control and building better ships. Japanese captains were ordinarily quite skilled, but the designs of Japanese cruisers, in particular, overreached what could be done with a given amount of displacement. American cruisers did not look so impressive on paper, but delivered sterling service in the Pacific.

I've read Fuchida's book on Midway and, personally, didn't come away with that much. After the war, Fuchida became quite enamored with the USA and even became a minister. In his book, I recall him going over the Japanese "victory disease," which caused them to disregard the warnings of more cautious admirals and war games. But the same thing had been said by many others, including Japanese. Observations regarding the lack of Japanese reconnaissance were no surprise, either. The USN relied on intelligence, having gotten its intelligence act more together after Pearl Harbor. Where Kimmel whined about not having enough PBYs to mount effective patrols, so hardly had anything in the air, Nimitz had effective patrols and denied Japanese refueling at French Frigate shoals. It was also known that it was a Japanese mistake for Yamamoto to sail with the fleet, which, because of radio silence, took him out of control, while Nimitz remained ashore in Hawaii, not at sea but in full control of the battle.

The big thing I got from Fuchida's book was his admission that, after the war's end when the Americans told him that if the Pearl Harbor strike had destroyed the tank farms, the USN woudl have had to have retreated to the West Coast for lack of oil. The fact that the Japanese hadn't even thought of this tells one a great deal about their war planning.

But Churchill identified this Japanese weakness when he addressed the US Congress after Pearl Harbor, saying, "What kind of people do they think we are?" Churchill understood pretty well that, for all of the foibles of the Allies, the Axis powers were doomed when the USA got into the war.

[essdee1972]

ABM, awesome website you came across, man!! The first article I read was on Rukhsana Kausar. The descriptions of the terrorists are so awesome and to the point, one wishes one has the freedom to use that kinda lingo in real life!!

[xl_target]

XL, correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think that Kurita actually saw all of the "Taffy" escort carriers. One group of them was too far south to be seen.

As I understand it, even depth charges were being dropped on Kurita's ships -- any weapon available was used.

I believe you are correct Tim,
I think they could only physically see two or at the most three of the carriers.

Kurita's error was that, when he saw Sprague's Taffy 3, he ordered a general chase, and effectively lost control of the battle. Such a lesson could/should have been learned from Beatty's battlecruiser action at Dogger Bank during WW1. Ozawa's bait had been taken; Kurita didn't know that part, and one might mistake the Taffy "jeep carriers" for the main USN strike force, but by this time, the IJN was reduced to grasping at straws -- pressing home the attack may have been his best decision, despite the considerable damage his ships took. After all, even though they were damaged, none were lost in that action.

The Japanese always insisted on radio silence prior to conducting their operations. At Leyte, that was really a waste of time though it let Kurita sneak up on Taffy 3. It often seemed that this often led to the Japanese naval units not communicating enough with each other even after battle had been joined. For whatever reason, it seemed that their capital ships never seemed to fight as a cohesive team even when in close proximity with each other. Kurita was tasked to oppose the landings on Leyte island. When he went chasing after the Jeeps, he threw away everything as he never caught them and the landings continued unmolested. If he had let them run and got in among the troopships and the supply ships, who knows how much damage he might have done.

Carrier operations were perfected by the USN in the Pacific War, and even the British who were attached to the US Fleet at the end were taking lessons from the Americans. The whole business of the Pacific War showed how much the pendulum had swung to the Americans from the RN. The USN's engineering had overtaken British engineering in almost every department, except battleship armor, by the 30s. The RAF, insisting on keeping control of everything that flew, left the RN in the lurch when it came to carrier borne aircraft. The RN was making do with rather small ships and small air groups, where the USN and IJN understood that practical fleet carrier operations required an air group of 72 to 80 aircraft per carrier. British ships were designed to have access to British bases, and weren't intended to operate in the vast expanse of the Pacific, which was part of the USN's plan all along.

By the end of the war, no one could do Carriers like the US but keep in mind that the angled flight deck of the Essex class came from the Brits and the idea for the Jeeps came from the Brits too. HMS Audacity was the first Escort carrier of the war, converted from a captured German merchant ship. Previously USS Langley was a converted Collier but was converted to a seaplane tender in 1936.

Where the USN excelled over the IJN was in damage control and building better ships. Japanese captains were ordinarily quite skilled, but the designs of Japanese cruisers, in particular, overreached what could be done with a given amount of displacement. American cruisers did not look so impressive on paper, but delivered sterling service in the Pacific.

Absolutely! Another thing that the Americans could do extremely well was turnaround in the dry docks. Yorktown's 72 hour restoration to battle ready status helped tremendously during Midway.

I've read Fuchida's book on Midway and, personally, didn't come away with that much. After the war, Fuchida became quite enamored with the USA and even became a minister. In his book, I recall him going over the Japanese "victory disease," which caused them to disregard the warnings of more cautious admirals and war games. But the same thing had been said by many others, including Japanese. Observations regarding the lack of Japanese reconnaissance were no surprise, either. The USN relied on intelligence, having gotten its intelligence act more together after Pearl Harbor. Where Kimmel whined about not having enough PBYs to mount effective patrols, so hardly had anything in the air, Nimitz had effective patrols and denied Japanese refueling at French Frigate shoals. It was also known that it was a Japanese mistake for Yamamoto to sail with the fleet, which, because of radio silence, took him out of control, while Nimitz remained ashore in Hawaii, not at sea but in full control of the battle.

The big thing I got from Fuchida's book was his admission that, after the war's end when the Americans told him that if the Pearl Harbor strike had destroyed the tank farms, the USN woudl have had to have retreated to the West Coast for lack of oil. The fact that the Japanese hadn't even thought of this tells one a great deal about their war planning.

What comes across for Fuchida's book is something that helps explain Japanese losses in Naval battles from Midway on. There doesn't seem to be much emphasis on fleets acting as a team under a unified command. That only seemed to happen in a very general sense. Otherwise it seemed that each capital ship's captain seems to do his own thing. This doesn't seem to be the case with their destroyer flotillas, as they seemed to stick together but the capital ships seem to give each ships commander a lot of leeway which resulted in capital ships breaking off from the fleet even during action. The worst part is that often it seemed that other members of the fleet were unaware of what the rest of the fleet were doing. They just didn't seem to communicate effectively with each other like the Allies did or to be able to work in concert as a team.

But Churchill identified this Japanese weakness when he addressed the US Congress after Pearl Harbor, saying, "What kind of people do they think we are?" Churchill understood pretty well that, for all of the foibles of the Allies, the Axis powers were doomed when the USA got into the war.

Yup

[timmy]

Kurita was tasked to oppose the landings on Leyte island. When he went chasing after the Jeeps, he threw away everything as he never caught them and the landings continued unmolested. If he had let them run and got in among the troopships and the supply ships, who knows how much damage he might have done.

Yes, sir, he could have really chewed up the landing craft and supply ships at the beach. It would have been a carnage. I'm sure he still would have taken a lot of damage, as the Taffy groups would probably have attacked in the same way, but by this time, the IJN was a spent force -- trading what he would have lost was about as much as Kurita could accomplish, anyway. For instance, even if Yamato had been sunk, she would have accomplished more than she ended up doing. Same with Nagato, too.

By the end of the war, no one could do Carriers like the US but keep in mind that the angled flight deck of the Essex class came from the Brits and the idea for the Jeeps came from the Brits too.

True enough. The funny thing about the Americans was often to use other ideas -- look at the American Army's use of the French soixante-quinze during WW1: US soldiers greatly increased the rate of fire with their own ideas about how the gun should have been served.

My thoughts were centered around flight deck operations, which both the Americans and the Japanese mastered, and also the idea that large carriers supporting a useful air group of around 72 to 80 aircraft were what was needed. The British always had small carriers, and were not able to project power sufficiently with them. The Americans also wanted nothing to do with the British Pacific fleet toward the end of the Pacific War. There was no shortage of Anglophobia in the USA, from Admiral King on down (the man who was said to have shaved with a blowtorch every morning), but what really peeved the Americans were the short legged British ships, which were not suited to lengthy voyages like the Americans, and didn't come with their own supply train, either. All of that for a too-small air group did not sit well.

Remember, the USN pioneered coaling at sea back during the Great White Fleet days, with specialized ships to do the job. Later, the Americans perfected other ships for service in the Pacific. You may note that, in accounts about the Battle of the Coral Sea, it is always mentioned that the Japanese sunk the oiler Neosho. This piece of information is not too useful until one understands that Neosho was not just any oiler: She was a special fast oiler that was vital to Fletcher, as keeping carriers bunkered to certain levels was a must in the Pacific War. The loss of Neosho went far beyond the loss of just any old oiler, an important fact which most books don't present.

This doesn't seem to be the case with their destroyer flotillas, as they seemed to stick together

[/quote][/quote]

Both the Japanese destroyers and cruisers were handled expertly. The Japanese captains, along with Admirals Mikawa and "Tenacious" Tanaka, gave the bungling Americans a real schooling in how to handle cruisers both times. Callaghan bungled repeatedly at Guadalcanal, and despite it, the Americans did manage to disable an old battleship with just a cruiser force, although the American's guns were just about as effective on their own ships.

The thing here seems to me to be that the Americans could and did learn quickly, while the Japanese didn't seem to learn nearly as much during the war.

[essdee1972]

Just a question - could the Japanese philosophy of "saving face" and "seeking a glorious death for the Emperor" have any influence on how they waged war, at a tactical / strategic level? They did get bloody-nosed by Georgiy Zhukov on the Khalkhin-Gol early on, because of their insistence on face-saving.