Why did India drop an INSAS follow on, go for a fussy American SIG and a tired Russian AK ?

[Tosh.S.Das]

Can India call itself a serious military power, when it goes abroad for something as basic as an assault rifle?
Then, what does it choose? Not one, but two, dodgy models - a reincarnated Russian and an American prima donna with the constitution and temperament of a racehorse, as well as a calbre being edged out by the US military itself.
Meanwhile, what led Indian journalists to bad-mouth INSAS? Its performance problems were similar to those faced by the US M-16 or British SA-80, and nowhere near the G-36 which led to the death of German soldiers in Afghanistan. Were such comparisons even considered ?
More recently, warriors from Big Four consultants and the Adani Academy of War have kitted INSAS up in fancy dress. They must hope what looks good shoots good.
Second Opinion offers a more serious solution, to resuscitate INSAS, with a lethal, new calibre. India would get the fancy dress too, at a more decent price, just like mine on the pic attached.

[HasnainQureshi21]

I heard it had to do something with commission

When firearms are bought from another nations, certain people get commission.

These people don't want their "income" to end because we started manufacturing our arms

[eljefe]

Makes a lot of sense.
The physical dimensions of the 6.5 Grendel are close to the .223 and IIRC there are a few kits already available to convert a M-16 variant/ clone to the Grendel.
I’ve owned the 6.5 Grendel in a bolt action, for a few years and ballistically, I found it to be LOT of bang for the buck. Especially the transonic shift and stability and the retained energy.
I must confess, I have a predilection for the ‘happy caliber’ the 6.5 and 7 mm! Invented with paperwork, lots of foresight, and no software, I’ve seen them perform with all projectile weights in one rifle twist.
Try that with a .223 !

What is a mystery is, when a couple of generations of the SLR went bang enough to win a couple of wars, even with the shoddy QC of the ‘Hon’able company of Bed pan makers’ ammo, how much has it worsened , not to function well in the 716?

It doesn’t take too much of a redesign to rid the INSAS of its design flaws and change to the 6.5Grendel. We might just have a winner there.

But then again, going by the time honoured tradition of the Babu’s -kickbacks and favours, for defense procurement deals, I fear for the development of newer projects like the ASMI- designed in house by the end users involved.

[Tosh.S.Das]

Great comments, eljefe. Thanks. Seems by far the most encouraging endorsement of my thesis - that INSAS was done in, could have been improved, and may well be (still) given a new lease of life. Whether or not the 6.5 or even 6 ARC works satisfactorily, who can tell. But the fact that such a possibility was not even thought about is curious - as much as the absence of attention to the G-36 or problems with the M-16s and SA-80s.
I remain perplexed how the custodians of the Indian army cannot give it its own assault rifle; I guess this parallels the lack of mention in NCERT texts about the record of history's largest volunteer army, from Neuve Chapelle and Chunak Bair to Tobruk and Haifa.

[shooter50]

Thank you for the informative post and the video.
On the main Rifle forum 'INSAS' subject we had many self styled experts with loads of theoretical knowledge and little field experience describing it as junk.

In response on 18th May 2010 (almost 15 years back), based on my experience with the INSAS. I wrote

"Interesting and informative post for the uninitiated but terribly blinkered. The INSAS needs modifications and a few refinements but it is definately not junk!!! It is slightly overpriced but remember importing a few AKs or other assault rifles at lower prices is irrelevant when our requirement is close to two million !! "

The 5.56 cartridge has its limitations and that must be borne in mind while assessing the rifle. Glad that a similar perspective has now emerged. The Army's present choice is however a better, more modern and versatile weapon than the old INSAS.
Best Wishes

[timmy]

I believe this is the post that's being referred to from March 2010:

viewtopic.php?f=13&t=9131

The OP on this was posted by our member Cottage Cheese, who handled the rifles and took a number of pictures while he disassembled them. I have not handled an INSAS myself, however, I would take member Cottage Cheese's word for what he saw and his assessment thereof.

[timmy]

re: the post linked above by Cottage Cheese, he refers to a review by Jonah, member Jonahpatch. Here it is:

viewtopic.php?f=13&t=2612&start=15#p30573

[Tosh.S.Das]

Great analysis and comments here. I would be stupid to try engaging with the blitzkrieg of data from Cottage Cheese or Jonah, relayed via Timmy, except to underline endorsement of my thesis that "technicalities and bad PR" aside, INSAS is "really a sweet shooter" and that it took the US "40 years to develop the M16 to what it is now." Wish someone had mentioned the G-36.
Now for some small extras.
I don't think INSAS needeed too much of "added Kalashnikov flavour" for "cheap and mass production", as (I am told that) the FNC was inspired by AKs to use cheap steel grades, the longstroke gas piston and extractor/ejector, and crucially separated upper and lower receivers, stamped and milled. The FNC had success in Indonesia, to where it was targeted, and Sweden, whose choice was political.
As far INSAS is concerned, the separation of receivers opens the 6.5 Grendel option. I also think the transition of the "ill-fated CAL" to FNC could hold /have held lessons. Politics killed CAL, as it (almost) did to FAL when the Americans shifted to the M-14, in spite of forcing the Belgians to have taken up 7.62 x 51 /308 for FAL, instead of 280. In the case of FN, the French would have been its major customer ... had the Belgians bought the Mirage instead of the F-16 (with all its payoffs - Bofors, by comparison, was chicken feed).
Such politics and compulsions must of course be part of the choices made on the 203 and the 716. Hopefully the cost-benefit aspects are accounted for.

[Machoman]

Answer is Thanks to kickbacks.

[Tosh.S.Das]

Machoman, thanks.
4) I have no doubt the AK 203 will do the job, as will the SIG. It is the soldier who counts. Tennis shoes were good enough for him at Kargil. But this should not be taken for granted either.
5) The INSAS fancy dress, I imagine, will be sold at very inflated prices. I have serious doubts about the quality of some of the red dot sights I see on some offerings. There are Chinese ones which can be got at 50 dollars and which lose zero with a 16 joules air rifle.


Please avoid discussing political or issues not directly related to firearms. Thank you for your cooperation.-Moderator

[MikeRobert]

India's reliance on foreign rifles questioned, INSAS unfairly criticized, potential for domestic upgrade proposed.

[timmy]

My comments here are tangental, but still relevant to this thread. I have decided to post here, in spite of this, rather than starting a new thread. Cartridge choice is a very involved matter, chiefly because there is no cartridge that can do everything, meaning that this is an area where the best can be the enemy of the good.

. . . I also think the transition of the "ill-fated CAL" to FNC could hold /have held lessons. Politics killed CAL, as it (almost) did to FAL when the Americans shifted to the M-14, in spite of forcing the Belgians to have taken up 7.62 x 51 /308 for FAL, instead of 280.

Many folks, especially those of the British or Commonwealth persuasion, are prone to a great deal of hand-wringing over the business of the "best" cartridge for infantry and the passing over of what they think was the best -- the 280 -- as opposed to the selected 7.62 x 51 NATO, which was "forced down their throats" by the evil machinations of a supposedly stupid and oppressive Uncle Sam. While such views may be convenient to certain preconceived notions, they don't take into account the way the world was in the 40s and 50s.

I note here that both World Wars showed that the "killer" on the battlefield was artillery, not the individual infantry weapon. (Taking this further, the sidarm or handgun choice was not a determinant of battle victory to an even much greater degree than the choice of rifle.)

I sometimes get the impression that, when the choice of the infantry cartridge and the 280 vs. 7.61 x 51 takes place, very litle consideration is given as to the actual comparison between these two cartridges. Wikipedia, an easily accessible source, shows this:

7.62 x 39 Soviet:
Bullet mass/type Velocity Energy
7.9 g (122 gr) 57N231 FMJ 730.3 m/s (2,396 ft/s) 2,108 J (1,555 ft⋅lbf)

10.0 g (154 gr) SP 641.3 m/s (2,104 ft/s) 2,056 J (1,516 ft⋅lbf)

8.0 g (123 gr) FMJ 738.0 m/s (2,421 ft/s) 2,179 J (1,607 ft⋅lbf)

280 British:

Bullet mass/type Velocity Energy
139 gr (9 g) Ball 2,270 ft/s (690 m/s) 1,595 ft⋅lbf (2,163 J)

140 gr (9 g) Ball 2,549 ft/s (777 m/s) 2,019 ft⋅lbf (2,737 J)
7 mm Mk 1Z

7.62 x 51 NATO:

Bullet mass/type Velocity Energy
147 gr (10 g) M80 FMJ 2,800 ft/s (850 m/s) 2,559 ft⋅lbf (3,470 J)

150.5 gr (10 g) M59 mild steel core FMJ
2,809 ft/s (856 m/s) 2,648 ft⋅lbf (3,590 J)

175 gr (11 g) M118 long range BTHP
2,600 ft/s (790 m/s) 2,627 ft⋅lbf (3,562 J)

(Make sure when comparing, you don't mix velocity in ft/s with m/s and don't mix energy in ft-lbf with J (joules)

Firstly, you should note that the 280 British, in its first iteration, is much closer 7.62 x 39 Soviet than it is to 7.62 x 51 NATO. The 280 British was faulted for this and so a later "7mm Mk 12 1Z" loading was developed to address this, but the British round still didn't come close to the NATO round in power/performance.

Recall that the European theater was the chief concern of military planners in the 40s and 50s. The Soviet forces faced the Western NATO forces across the Iron Curtin in the 40s and 50s. While the 280 British round may have made some sense for the individual infantryman, there were other concerns that were equally demanding consideration at the time:

1. Logistics: The Western European economy during these times was still greatly affected by the destruction of WW2. MAnufacture of war goods was largely based in the USA at this time. This meant that, in the case of war, the lion's share of munitions were going to have to come from the USA, shipped across the Atlantic Ocean.Small arms ammunition would need to compete with all the other needs of war for cargo space in these ships at a rate that could keep up with Soviet Armies, supplied by much shorter rail connections. This would be a massive ground war, essentially fought with WW2 and near post-WW2 weapons, not tactical and intermediate range nuclear ones.

This logistical bottleneck meant that a cartridge had to do more than just be chambered in an infantryman's rifle. One issue that had been observed even before WW2 was the need for long range machine gun performance. The Germans and the Americans both developed heavier bullet loadings for their small arms cartridges for this reason. They gave up flatter shooting loads for longer effective range, rather than introducing new cartridges.

The British and Americans, in fact, had both identified the 7mm bore as ideal as an infantry rifle's cartridge, the British on the eve of WW1 and the Americans in the 30s. Teh P14 Enfield, a British design based on the Mauser, was chambered for a 7mm cartridge, but this was dropped right before WW! -- there wasn't time to introduce a new rifle and build up stocks of ammunition. The tooling for the P14 was eventually used to build those rifles chambered in .303. The Americans developed the 276 Pedersen for the new semiautomatic Garand rifle, but the scarce military finances during the Depression were more needed elsewhere, and the Garand came out chambered in .30-'06.

Both of these cases show how the good was selected when the "best" wasn't really what was best.

Similarly, the need for NATO was identified as a round that could be used in rifles, squad automatic weapons (the German use of M34 and M42 machine guns had shown the way on the need for effective squad automatic fire) and other uses, such as the M134 Minigun. Rather than nitpicking over some theoretical ideal, the usefulness to the entire war needs of a single round to be used in all of these roles was accepted for supply and logistics reasons, and various compromises in each individual role was accepted as the price to pay for getting the needed ammo to the troops.

I have to reject the arguments for a theoretical "best" in one area of battle needs that sacrifices many other needs that were also important. To put it bluntly, the British were totally unable to meet their battlefield needs in WW2 without the USA's manufacturing establishment. How would this have been any different in a European conventional confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 40s and 50s?

For these reasons, I assert that the 7.62 NATO round was the best choice for the NATO small arms cartridge, just like the 303 was the best choice for the British in WW1 and the .30-'06 was the best choice for the USA in WW2.

2. The M14 was unquestionably a turkey. it was clearly inferior to the FN-FAL as a Cold War battle rifle and the AR10, which originally competed against it, would likely have been superior in service, as well. The M14 was especially deficient in the area of controllable automatic fire from the shoulder.

As is well known, the Air Force wanted something better for its support troops than the existing M1 Carbines. (Big surprise here!) a smaller version of the AR10, the AR15, was developed around the Remington 222/222 Magnum cartridge family, which eventually became the 5.56 x 45 NATO round.

3. India -- what does all of this mean for India? India faces a diverse set of needs on the Himalayan, Kashmir, and Western front threats, which have their own set of needs. Should multiple rifles and cartridges be developed for each need? This would present both logistical and supply issues, along with maximizing production for large numbers of troops. Or, should compromises be accepted in each area for one overall infantry weapon and cartridge. Just as in the NATO example above, such choices need to take into account the fact that the infantry rifle cartridge will be called upon to do other duty, such as small automatic weapons, unless a multiple cartridge approach is chosen.

This is a pretty tall order from a cartridge. Added to this is the issue of supplying arms and munitions to a numerically large Army, so the cost of manufacture or procurement is also a vital issue. I'm reminded here of the British and the Soviets, both of who stayed with designs that were perhaps not optimal in WW2, but certainly got the job done in every sort of condition and in every sort of theater of operations. The "good" was certainly better than the "best" in their experience.

[arghya555]

Out of curiosity - AR15 and AR10 designs are publicly available and the patent on them expired long back. What is preventing OFI from manufacturing those? Patent laws didn't prevent OFB to copy the FN FAL to SLR.

The AR10/15 platforms have much easier mag loading capability and the modular design means changing barrels or replcing parts are exremely easy.

[timmy]

Patent laws didn't prevent OFB to copy the FN FAL to SLR.

True, but copying patents without paying royalties is often frowned upon.

From The FN-FAL Battle Rifle by Bob Cashner (an Osprey book):

So, ARDE’s Small Arms Design Group began drawing up plans for their own weapon, incorporating what suited their military needs best by using their existing FALs and L1A1s as patterns. Thus, the resultant 1A was a mixture of Inch- and Metric-pattern components. As a consequence, most Indian parts are not interchangeable with either Metric-pattern FALs or Commonwealth Inch-pattern SLRs. Manufacture of the 1A began at the Ishapore Rifle Factory in 1960.

This move, of course, did not sit well with FN; in the Belgians’ opinion, the 1A was merely an unlicensed copy of their FAL. An international row ensued. The Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), apparently hadn’t been aware of the dealings either, and successfully satisfied FN’s complaints by purchasing additional standard FALs, FALOs and 60.20 GPMGs manufactured by FN in Belgium.

Get hold of a copy of this book for the full story.

There is a merry business of building AR15 copies by many, from individuals to fairly large companies today. Setting up the tooling to manufacture them in quantities suitable for supplying a large army would be a major undertaking and financial investment.

[Tosh.S.Das]

In reply to Timmy on "copying patents without paying royalties is often frowned upon."
FN had live patents in 1960.
AR's, on their side, have enough new/derivative IP for constructing piracy claims (or innuendoes), so the net result will be the same, probably worse, as the US takes IP more seriously than the Belgians or anyone else.
I still think a Grendel upper may be more than a half-way solution to a new 'Indianized' successor. The Israeli ARAD for example is an AR, but with short stroke piston rather than direct impingement.