My comments here are tangental, but still relevant to this thread. I have decided to post here, in spite of this, rather than starting a new thread. Cartridge choice is a very involved matter, chiefly because there is no cartridge that can do everything, meaning that this is an area where the best can be the enemy of the good.
Tosh.S.Das wrote: ↑Wed Jul 31, 2024 5:17 pm
. . . I also think the transition of the "ill-fated CAL" to FNC could hold /have held lessons. Politics killed CAL, as it (almost) did to FAL when the Americans shifted to the M-14, in spite of forcing the Belgians to have taken up 7.62 x 51 /308 for FAL, instead of 280.
Many folks, especially those of the British or Commonwealth persuasion, are prone to a great deal of hand-wringing over the business of the "best" cartridge for infantry and the passing over of what they think was the best -- the 280 -- as opposed to the selected 7.62 x 51 NATO, which was "forced down their throats" by the evil machinations of a supposedly stupid and oppressive Uncle Sam. While such views may be convenient to certain preconceived notions, they don't take into account the way the world was in the 40s and 50s.
I note here that both World Wars showed that the "killer" on the battlefield was artillery, not the individual infantry weapon. (Taking this further, the sidarm or handgun choice was not a determinant of battle victory to an even much greater degree than the choice of rifle.)
I sometimes get the impression that, when the choice of the infantry cartridge and the 280 vs. 7.61 x 51 takes place, very litle consideration is given as to the actual comparison between these two cartridges. Wikipedia, an easily accessible source, shows this:
7.62 x 39 Soviet:
Bullet mass/type Velocity Energy
7.9 g (122 gr) 57N231 FMJ 730.3 m/s (2,396 ft/s) 2,108 J (1,555 ft⋅lbf)
10.0 g (154 gr) SP 641.3 m/s (2,104 ft/s) 2,056 J (1,516 ft⋅lbf)
8.0 g (123 gr) FMJ 738.0 m/s (2,421 ft/s) 2,179 J (1,607 ft⋅lbf)
280 British:
Bullet mass/type Velocity Energy
139 gr (9 g) Ball 2,270 ft/s (690 m/s) 1,595 ft⋅lbf (2,163 J)
140 gr (9 g) Ball 2,549 ft/s (777 m/s) 2,019 ft⋅lbf (2,737 J)
7 mm Mk 1Z
7.62 x 51 NATO:
Bullet mass/type Velocity Energy
147 gr (10 g) M80 FMJ 2,800 ft/s (850 m/s) 2,559 ft⋅lbf (3,470 J)
150.5 gr (10 g) M59 mild steel core FMJ
2,809 ft/s (856 m/s) 2,648 ft⋅lbf (3,590 J)
175 gr (11 g) M118 long range BTHP
2,600 ft/s (790 m/s) 2,627 ft⋅lbf (3,562 J)
(Make sure when comparing, you don't mix velocity in ft/s with m/s and don't mix energy in ft-lbf with J (joules)
Firstly, you should note that the 280 British, in its first iteration, is much closer 7.62 x 39 Soviet than it is to 7.62 x 51 NATO. The 280 British was faulted for this and so a later "7mm Mk 12 1Z" loading was developed to address this, but the British round still didn't come close to the NATO round in power/performance.
Recall that the European theater was the chief concern of military planners in the 40s and 50s. The Soviet forces faced the Western NATO forces across the Iron Curtin in the 40s and 50s. While the 280 British round may have made some sense for the individual infantryman, there were other concerns that were equally demanding consideration at the time:
1. Logistics: The Western European economy during these times was still greatly affected by the destruction of WW2. MAnufacture of war goods was largely based in the USA at this time. This meant that, in the case of war, the lion's share of munitions were going to have to come from the USA, shipped across the Atlantic Ocean.Small arms ammunition would need to compete with all the other needs of war for cargo space in these ships at a rate that could keep up with Soviet Armies, supplied by much shorter rail connections. This would be a massive ground war, essentially fought with WW2 and near post-WW2 weapons, not tactical and intermediate range nuclear ones.
This logistical bottleneck meant that a cartridge had to do more than just be chambered in an infantryman's rifle. One issue that had been observed even before WW2 was the need for long range machine gun performance. The Germans and the Americans both developed heavier bullet loadings for their small arms cartridges for this reason. They gave up flatter shooting loads for longer effective range, rather than introducing new cartridges.
The British and Americans, in fact, had both identified the 7mm bore as ideal as an infantry rifle's cartridge, the British on the eve of WW1 and the Americans in the 30s. Teh P14 Enfield, a British design based on the Mauser, was chambered for a 7mm cartridge, but this was dropped right before WW! -- there wasn't time to introduce a new rifle and build up stocks of ammunition. The tooling for the P14 was eventually used to build those rifles chambered in .303. The Americans developed the 276 Pedersen for the new semiautomatic Garand rifle, but the scarce military finances during the Depression were more needed elsewhere, and the Garand came out chambered in .30-'06.
Both of these cases show how the good was selected when the "best" wasn't really what was best.
Similarly, the need for NATO was identified as a round that could be used in rifles, squad automatic weapons (the German use of M34 and M42 machine guns had shown the way on the need for effective squad automatic fire) and other uses, such as the M134 Minigun. Rather than nitpicking over some theoretical ideal, the usefulness to the entire war needs of a single round to be used in all of these roles was accepted for supply and logistics reasons, and various compromises in each individual role was accepted as the price to pay for getting the needed ammo to the troops.
I have to reject the arguments for a theoretical "best" in one area of battle needs that sacrifices many other needs that were also important. To put it bluntly, the British were totally unable to meet their battlefield needs in WW2 without the USA's manufacturing establishment. How would this have been any different in a European conventional confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 40s and 50s?
For these reasons, I assert that the 7.62 NATO round was the best choice for the NATO small arms cartridge, just like the 303 was the best choice for the British in WW1 and the .30-'06 was the best choice for the USA in WW2.
2. The M14 was unquestionably a turkey. it was clearly inferior to the FN-FAL as a Cold War battle rifle and the AR10, which originally competed against it, would likely have been superior in service, as well. The M14 was especially deficient in the area of controllable automatic fire from the shoulder.
As is well known, the Air Force wanted something better for its support troops than the existing M1 Carbines. (Big surprise here!) a smaller version of the AR10, the AR15, was developed around the Remington 222/222 Magnum cartridge family, which eventually became the 5.56 x 45 NATO round.
3. India -- what does all of this mean for India? India faces a diverse set of needs on the Himalayan, Kashmir, and Western front threats, which have their own set of needs. Should multiple rifles and cartridges be developed for each need? This would present both logistical and supply issues, along with maximizing production for large numbers of troops. Or, should compromises be accepted in each area for one overall infantry weapon and cartridge. Just as in the NATO example above, such choices need to take into account the fact that the infantry rifle cartridge will be called upon to do other duty, such as small automatic weapons, unless a multiple cartridge approach is chosen.
This is a pretty tall order from a cartridge. Added to this is the issue of supplying arms and munitions to a numerically large Army, so the cost of manufacture or procurement is also a vital issue. I'm reminded here of the British and the Soviets, both of who stayed with designs that were perhaps not optimal in WW2, but certainly got the job done in every sort of condition and in every sort of theater of operations. The "good" was certainly better than the "best" in their experience.
), based on my experience with the INSAS. I wrote