Role of Enfield in 1857 First war of Independence
Posted: Fri Apr 15, 2011 6:46 am
I read this article on highroad but I have read A H Amin’s articles before probably on defence journal a Pakistani site or somewhere else and very factual article on how superior Enfield rifle was probably the key factor which enabled Britishers in prevailing in first war of Independence. I came across this while looking up info on guns of that war. Also do read about the sniper Bob at Lucknow residency. Not sure whether this sniper tale is true or not..welcome any comments on weapons of that era
Technical and Tactical Superiority of the Enfield Rifle over the Brown Bess Rifle held by the Indian Rebels in 1857
By A.H Amin
1998
http://www.thehighroad.org/archive/inde ... 46217.html
The Enfield Rifle played a decisive role in defeating the rebellion of 1857. Much more than the British officers of that time or most British historians since 1947 want anyone to know. This tendency is understandable because it deflates the deliberately cultivated myth of "White Man's Superiority" in the post 1857 sociopolitical scenario. There is no doubt that the British soldier was brave, that their younger officer lot was resolute and that their higher commanders were by and large an assorted bunch of incompetent old men.
S.S. Thorbum was one of those very few Britons who admitted the superiority of the Enfield Rifle and the decisive part it played in the Sepoy defeat in 1857. In the Appendix of Thorburn's book which few people read, Thorburn made a very profound observation, he said, "Had the sepoys accepted the Enfield and mutinied afterwards, our difficulties in suppressing their revolt would have been enormously increased453.
A very simple gauge of this fact is the high proportion of EEIC's Bengal Army casualties in the First and Second Sikh Wars. This happened because the EEIC forces till 1849 were still equipped with the old Brown Bess Musket and the Sikhs were armed with a similar weapon. Thus the British suffered a very high proportion of casualties, in the Sikh wars as compared to the battles of 1857. Thus the following comparison is thought provoking:-
1. Mudki:- British Casualties - (First Sikh War) - 454
a. Total Strength - 12,350
b. Casualties - 872 men or 7.06%
c. Details -
(1) Killed - 215 or 1.74% of total
(2) Wounded - 657 or 5.32% of total
2. Feroz Shah - British Casualties - (First Sikh War)455
a. Total strength - 16,700
b. Casualties - 2415 or 14.46%
c. (Details:- -
(1) Killed - 694 or 4.154% of total
(2) Wounded - 1721 or 10.31% of total
3. Lucknow - March 1858 - British Casualties - 456:-
a. Total strength - 19,771
b. Casualties - 735 or 3.72%
c. Details:-
(1) Killed - 127 or 0.64% of total
(2) Wounded - 608 or 3.08% of total
The British casualties at siege of Delhi were higher because in Delhi most of the fighting was done at very close ranges and thus the advantage of longer range of Enfield Rifle was nullified. Secondly a large number of British casualties were caused by artillery fire. Technically and tactically speaking the Brown Bess musket was hopelessly outmatched by the Enfield rifle. The Brown Bess did not have an effective range of more than 100 yards and a maximum range of 200 yards. The Enfield with a. .577 calibre had an effective range of 900 yards. It could be rapidly reloaded and thus could fire upto four rounds per minute. The Brown Bess could not fire more than one round per minute in actual battle conditions457.
The sepoys were hopelessly outgunned in comparison with European troops they were facing in terms of actual infantry tactical combat. The European troops could play havoc with the sepoys even before they could get as close as 200 or 300 yeads. The same thus happened at Trimmu Ghat where Nicholsons largely European force armed with Enfields effectively annihilated the 46 NI even before they were within 200 yards of Nicholson’s force. The sepoys knew the tactical potential of the Enfield Rifle but mistakenly advanced against Nicholson's force thinking that they are loyal native troops because Nicholson’s Europeans were dressed in Khaki coloured uniforms. Lack of sepoy resolution to advance against Europeans in deliberate attack has a considerable connection with the immense technical and tactical superiority of the Enfield Rifle. This explains why the sepoys mostly used defensive lines at Lucknow and Delhi as their most favoured form of warfare. But we are still at a loss while explaining our failure at Valtoha despite the fact that we possessed both numerical and technical superiority in the shape of the Patton Tanks! Two British authors were much more intellectually honest in thus explaining the devastating tactical potential of the Enfield in 1857. They thus described the battle of Trimmu Ghat fought between Nicholson's moveable column and the 46 NI and 9 light cavalry on 12 July 1857 in the following words; "It was here for the first time that the "Enfield" demonstrated its enormous superiority as a weapon. At 300 yards the smooth bores of the 46th were firing at twice their optimum combat range and most of the fire was totally ineffective, the balls were half spent and wildly inaccurate. The Enfield's in contrast sighted as they were up to nine hundred yards and throwing a point five seven bullet of substantially higher muzzle velocity were firing at near point blank range, and with devastating effect. The heavy soft lead, high velocity bullets mushroomed as they struck home and the impact frequently stopped the advancing Sepoys dead in their tracks. At that range there were very few wounded, a solid hit would tear a jagged entry hole and leave an exit wound the size of a dinner plate. In the face of this withering fire the mutineers pressed home their attacks desperately, some of them coming to within 50 yards of the 52nd's ranks, but no troops could sustain that kind of battering and ran,...458.
It appears that more than the resolution of the British officer or the native subsidiary collaborator, or north of Jhelum River's martial races or the fiery Sikhs, it was above all the "Enfield" Rifle which was the real victor of 1857. But the British were clever. They stressed the superiority of white man more than the superiority of Enfield. Hardly any British account of that time admitted the role that Enfield Rifle played in the defeat of the Sepoys! The capabilities of the Enfield were never discussed and it was never compared with the Brown Bess! There is no doubt that the British officer in 1857 was a better leader. But can we blame the Indian of 1857 for not being a leader. His rights were usurped the day the northern invader started invading the Indo Pak region. Whatever the Sepoys of 1857 did was very extraordinary keeping in view their circumstances.
The introduction of accurate rifles as a matter of fact revolutionised warfare in the mid nineteenth century. What was happening in India in 1857 was not merely an “India only��? phenomena but was taking place in other parts of the world also. The Brown Bess Musket balls had thus hopped and rolled in flight leading to unpredictable results. The invention and innovation of Minie rifle developed in the 1840s revolutionised and dramatically changed infantry tactics. Before the 1840s the effective range of infantry weapons was 100 to 300 metres. The Minie Rifle increased this effective range to 1000 metres. In 1849 a Prussian Army suppressed a popular rising in Baden in Germany with devastating effect using the new Dreyse Rifle. Thus a German newspaper commented as following; Against a column of old musketeers, the impact of these new rifles is dreadful��?.459 In the Crimean War again in 1854 - 56 the superiority of the superior long range rifles was proved in a scenario where two European conventional armies fought on generally more equal terms taken the Sepoys versus the British in India in 1857.
Here at the Battle of Inkerman British infantry armed with French “Minie Rifles��? annihilated some 15,000 men out of a total Russian force of 27,000. In this battle the Russians were attacking the British in close order formation in vogue before the advent of Minie Rifle on the battlefield460. In Prussia the German General Moltke the Elder could not help commenting that “The English bullets simply could not miss��?461. This was not all, the new rifles to be effectively used required a soldier who had a good basic education and reasonable IQ because range between 100 to 500 metres was not easy to estimate by naked eye method which we call “JD��? or “Judging Distance��? in the army. Thus it was observed that in the US Civil War an average Union Army Soldier on the average consumed 900 pounds of lead and 240 pounds of powder to kill his enemy i.e. the Confederate Army soldier! This average figure it must be noted was for killing just “one Confederate soldier��?462. During the Prusso - Danish war of 1864 it was observed that the Prussian Dreyse Rifle which was superior to Minie Rifle. During this war in a small unit action 124 Prussian soldiers convincingly defeated 180 Danish soldiers by virtue of superior weaponry i.e. the Dreyse Rifle. Thus the Prussians started firing from 250 metres range and by the time the Danish were at the 150 metres line the Prussians troops had fired thrice ensuring that the Danish attack broke up and the Danish withdrew463. In another action in the Prusso - Danish war the Prussians opened fire on a Danish attacking unit at the range of 250 paces. After advancing for 100 more paces the Danish broke up and withdrew after having suffered 50% casualties464.
All these very convincing examples quoted from European military history dismiss the myth of “white man's superiority��? which the post 1857 British writers attempted to impose on the people of Indo Pak. These myths certainly had a negative influence on the Indo Pak man's mind in the period 1857 - 1947 and succeeded in a considerable manner in creating a docile Indian who silently accepted the British supremacy. Even today many Indo Pak writers are baffled at the overwhelming sepoy - British - Loyal Indian numerical differences in the battles of 1857. They are at a loss to explain why so few Britishers and Loyal Indians could defeat so many rebel sepoys in 1857. This aspect has two dimensions which we will discuss in greater detail in the later part of our analysis. However, in a nutshell, firstly the Enfield Rifle" seriously offset the “Sepoy Numerical superiority��? and secondly the “Sepoy numerical superiority��? was highly exaggerated by British soldiers who fought the battles of 1857 and by the post 1857 British Historians. These Britishers with few exceptions like Malleson were mostly praising and projecting each other!
Another very convincing proof about British conviction regarding the vast superiority of Enfield Rifle over the Brown Bess lies in the post 1857 native infantry standard personal weapon policy adopted by the British military authorities in India. The Enfield P-53 rifle was not issued at all to the native soldiers in India after 1857. Not even to the trusted so called martial races north of River Jhelum or Chenab! A very clever policy was adopted by issuing to the native troops a rifle which was identical to the Enfield rifle, but only externally. These were nomenclatured as the P.58 and P.59 muskets for “Native Infantry��?. These were of .656 smooth bore calibre and had an effective range of 200 yards as compared to the P.53 Enfield Rifle issued to the European troops which had an effective range of 900 to 1000 yards and was of .577 calibre. The Sikhs were trusted a little more and were issued Brunswick rifles which were a little better than the P.58 and P.59 Enfield muskets issued to the native infantry 465.
Thus when in 1866 the vastly superior Snider breach loading rifles were issued to the British units in India, the now inferior P.53 Enfield muzzle loaded rifle of the British soldiers was handed over to the native soldier. A breach loading rifle was hundred times superior to a muzzle loading rifle! Thus in 1874 when the British soldiers were issued the Martini Henri Rifle some phased out Sniders were issued to the Indian infantry. In 1892 once a newer and far superior Lee Metford Rifle was supplied to the British Army, the now outdated Martini Henry was given to the Indian Army. Even in 1911 the Indian soldier was issued a single shot non magazine weapon while the British soldier held a longer range magazine Lee-Enfield and Lee Metford Rifle466! The white man's supremacy was maintained by technically superior weapons!!.
The ironic aspect of the whole affair is that so effective was the British propaganda that many Indian and Pakistanis writing as late as 1971 were still convinced that the British of 1857 were more supermen and were really out numbered overwhelmingly by the rebel sepoys. Nowhere did these Indo Pak historians appreciate or point out the tremendous technical/tactical superiority of the Enfield Rifle. The over exaggerated figures of sepoy strength advanced by the British were also nowhere challenged. This is the irony of pre 1947 colonial history and historians of the post 1947 era have a very serious responsibility on their shoulders. The beauty and the irony lies in the fact that loyal Muslims and Hindus were a party in perpetuating such myths.
Technical and Tactical Superiority of the Enfield Rifle over the Brown Bess Rifle held by the Indian Rebels in 1857
By A.H Amin
1998
http://www.thehighroad.org/archive/inde ... 46217.html
The Enfield Rifle played a decisive role in defeating the rebellion of 1857. Much more than the British officers of that time or most British historians since 1947 want anyone to know. This tendency is understandable because it deflates the deliberately cultivated myth of "White Man's Superiority" in the post 1857 sociopolitical scenario. There is no doubt that the British soldier was brave, that their younger officer lot was resolute and that their higher commanders were by and large an assorted bunch of incompetent old men.
S.S. Thorbum was one of those very few Britons who admitted the superiority of the Enfield Rifle and the decisive part it played in the Sepoy defeat in 1857. In the Appendix of Thorburn's book which few people read, Thorburn made a very profound observation, he said, "Had the sepoys accepted the Enfield and mutinied afterwards, our difficulties in suppressing their revolt would have been enormously increased453.
A very simple gauge of this fact is the high proportion of EEIC's Bengal Army casualties in the First and Second Sikh Wars. This happened because the EEIC forces till 1849 were still equipped with the old Brown Bess Musket and the Sikhs were armed with a similar weapon. Thus the British suffered a very high proportion of casualties, in the Sikh wars as compared to the battles of 1857. Thus the following comparison is thought provoking:-
1. Mudki:- British Casualties - (First Sikh War) - 454
a. Total Strength - 12,350
b. Casualties - 872 men or 7.06%
c. Details -
(1) Killed - 215 or 1.74% of total
(2) Wounded - 657 or 5.32% of total
2. Feroz Shah - British Casualties - (First Sikh War)455
a. Total strength - 16,700
b. Casualties - 2415 or 14.46%
c. (Details:- -
(1) Killed - 694 or 4.154% of total
(2) Wounded - 1721 or 10.31% of total
3. Lucknow - March 1858 - British Casualties - 456:-
a. Total strength - 19,771
b. Casualties - 735 or 3.72%
c. Details:-
(1) Killed - 127 or 0.64% of total
(2) Wounded - 608 or 3.08% of total
The British casualties at siege of Delhi were higher because in Delhi most of the fighting was done at very close ranges and thus the advantage of longer range of Enfield Rifle was nullified. Secondly a large number of British casualties were caused by artillery fire. Technically and tactically speaking the Brown Bess musket was hopelessly outmatched by the Enfield rifle. The Brown Bess did not have an effective range of more than 100 yards and a maximum range of 200 yards. The Enfield with a. .577 calibre had an effective range of 900 yards. It could be rapidly reloaded and thus could fire upto four rounds per minute. The Brown Bess could not fire more than one round per minute in actual battle conditions457.
The sepoys were hopelessly outgunned in comparison with European troops they were facing in terms of actual infantry tactical combat. The European troops could play havoc with the sepoys even before they could get as close as 200 or 300 yeads. The same thus happened at Trimmu Ghat where Nicholsons largely European force armed with Enfields effectively annihilated the 46 NI even before they were within 200 yards of Nicholson’s force. The sepoys knew the tactical potential of the Enfield Rifle but mistakenly advanced against Nicholson's force thinking that they are loyal native troops because Nicholson’s Europeans were dressed in Khaki coloured uniforms. Lack of sepoy resolution to advance against Europeans in deliberate attack has a considerable connection with the immense technical and tactical superiority of the Enfield Rifle. This explains why the sepoys mostly used defensive lines at Lucknow and Delhi as their most favoured form of warfare. But we are still at a loss while explaining our failure at Valtoha despite the fact that we possessed both numerical and technical superiority in the shape of the Patton Tanks! Two British authors were much more intellectually honest in thus explaining the devastating tactical potential of the Enfield in 1857. They thus described the battle of Trimmu Ghat fought between Nicholson's moveable column and the 46 NI and 9 light cavalry on 12 July 1857 in the following words; "It was here for the first time that the "Enfield" demonstrated its enormous superiority as a weapon. At 300 yards the smooth bores of the 46th were firing at twice their optimum combat range and most of the fire was totally ineffective, the balls were half spent and wildly inaccurate. The Enfield's in contrast sighted as they were up to nine hundred yards and throwing a point five seven bullet of substantially higher muzzle velocity were firing at near point blank range, and with devastating effect. The heavy soft lead, high velocity bullets mushroomed as they struck home and the impact frequently stopped the advancing Sepoys dead in their tracks. At that range there were very few wounded, a solid hit would tear a jagged entry hole and leave an exit wound the size of a dinner plate. In the face of this withering fire the mutineers pressed home their attacks desperately, some of them coming to within 50 yards of the 52nd's ranks, but no troops could sustain that kind of battering and ran,...458.
It appears that more than the resolution of the British officer or the native subsidiary collaborator, or north of Jhelum River's martial races or the fiery Sikhs, it was above all the "Enfield" Rifle which was the real victor of 1857. But the British were clever. They stressed the superiority of white man more than the superiority of Enfield. Hardly any British account of that time admitted the role that Enfield Rifle played in the defeat of the Sepoys! The capabilities of the Enfield were never discussed and it was never compared with the Brown Bess! There is no doubt that the British officer in 1857 was a better leader. But can we blame the Indian of 1857 for not being a leader. His rights were usurped the day the northern invader started invading the Indo Pak region. Whatever the Sepoys of 1857 did was very extraordinary keeping in view their circumstances.
The introduction of accurate rifles as a matter of fact revolutionised warfare in the mid nineteenth century. What was happening in India in 1857 was not merely an “India only��? phenomena but was taking place in other parts of the world also. The Brown Bess Musket balls had thus hopped and rolled in flight leading to unpredictable results. The invention and innovation of Minie rifle developed in the 1840s revolutionised and dramatically changed infantry tactics. Before the 1840s the effective range of infantry weapons was 100 to 300 metres. The Minie Rifle increased this effective range to 1000 metres. In 1849 a Prussian Army suppressed a popular rising in Baden in Germany with devastating effect using the new Dreyse Rifle. Thus a German newspaper commented as following; Against a column of old musketeers, the impact of these new rifles is dreadful��?.459 In the Crimean War again in 1854 - 56 the superiority of the superior long range rifles was proved in a scenario where two European conventional armies fought on generally more equal terms taken the Sepoys versus the British in India in 1857.
Here at the Battle of Inkerman British infantry armed with French “Minie Rifles��? annihilated some 15,000 men out of a total Russian force of 27,000. In this battle the Russians were attacking the British in close order formation in vogue before the advent of Minie Rifle on the battlefield460. In Prussia the German General Moltke the Elder could not help commenting that “The English bullets simply could not miss��?461. This was not all, the new rifles to be effectively used required a soldier who had a good basic education and reasonable IQ because range between 100 to 500 metres was not easy to estimate by naked eye method which we call “JD��? or “Judging Distance��? in the army. Thus it was observed that in the US Civil War an average Union Army Soldier on the average consumed 900 pounds of lead and 240 pounds of powder to kill his enemy i.e. the Confederate Army soldier! This average figure it must be noted was for killing just “one Confederate soldier��?462. During the Prusso - Danish war of 1864 it was observed that the Prussian Dreyse Rifle which was superior to Minie Rifle. During this war in a small unit action 124 Prussian soldiers convincingly defeated 180 Danish soldiers by virtue of superior weaponry i.e. the Dreyse Rifle. Thus the Prussians started firing from 250 metres range and by the time the Danish were at the 150 metres line the Prussians troops had fired thrice ensuring that the Danish attack broke up and the Danish withdrew463. In another action in the Prusso - Danish war the Prussians opened fire on a Danish attacking unit at the range of 250 paces. After advancing for 100 more paces the Danish broke up and withdrew after having suffered 50% casualties464.
All these very convincing examples quoted from European military history dismiss the myth of “white man's superiority��? which the post 1857 British writers attempted to impose on the people of Indo Pak. These myths certainly had a negative influence on the Indo Pak man's mind in the period 1857 - 1947 and succeeded in a considerable manner in creating a docile Indian who silently accepted the British supremacy. Even today many Indo Pak writers are baffled at the overwhelming sepoy - British - Loyal Indian numerical differences in the battles of 1857. They are at a loss to explain why so few Britishers and Loyal Indians could defeat so many rebel sepoys in 1857. This aspect has two dimensions which we will discuss in greater detail in the later part of our analysis. However, in a nutshell, firstly the Enfield Rifle" seriously offset the “Sepoy Numerical superiority��? and secondly the “Sepoy numerical superiority��? was highly exaggerated by British soldiers who fought the battles of 1857 and by the post 1857 British Historians. These Britishers with few exceptions like Malleson were mostly praising and projecting each other!
Another very convincing proof about British conviction regarding the vast superiority of Enfield Rifle over the Brown Bess lies in the post 1857 native infantry standard personal weapon policy adopted by the British military authorities in India. The Enfield P-53 rifle was not issued at all to the native soldiers in India after 1857. Not even to the trusted so called martial races north of River Jhelum or Chenab! A very clever policy was adopted by issuing to the native troops a rifle which was identical to the Enfield rifle, but only externally. These were nomenclatured as the P.58 and P.59 muskets for “Native Infantry��?. These were of .656 smooth bore calibre and had an effective range of 200 yards as compared to the P.53 Enfield Rifle issued to the European troops which had an effective range of 900 to 1000 yards and was of .577 calibre. The Sikhs were trusted a little more and were issued Brunswick rifles which were a little better than the P.58 and P.59 Enfield muskets issued to the native infantry 465.
Thus when in 1866 the vastly superior Snider breach loading rifles were issued to the British units in India, the now inferior P.53 Enfield muzzle loaded rifle of the British soldiers was handed over to the native soldier. A breach loading rifle was hundred times superior to a muzzle loading rifle! Thus in 1874 when the British soldiers were issued the Martini Henri Rifle some phased out Sniders were issued to the Indian infantry. In 1892 once a newer and far superior Lee Metford Rifle was supplied to the British Army, the now outdated Martini Henry was given to the Indian Army. Even in 1911 the Indian soldier was issued a single shot non magazine weapon while the British soldier held a longer range magazine Lee-Enfield and Lee Metford Rifle466! The white man's supremacy was maintained by technically superior weapons!!.
The ironic aspect of the whole affair is that so effective was the British propaganda that many Indian and Pakistanis writing as late as 1971 were still convinced that the British of 1857 were more supermen and were really out numbered overwhelmingly by the rebel sepoys. Nowhere did these Indo Pak historians appreciate or point out the tremendous technical/tactical superiority of the Enfield Rifle. The over exaggerated figures of sepoy strength advanced by the British were also nowhere challenged. This is the irony of pre 1947 colonial history and historians of the post 1947 era have a very serious responsibility on their shoulders. The beauty and the irony lies in the fact that loyal Muslims and Hindus were a party in perpetuating such myths.