Indians For Guns

There was some discussion in the thread In Your opinion, which is the best battle rifle ever made? Regarding Japanese and American aircraft and also the heavy .50 caliber Browning machine gun, compared to other nations, which used rifle caliber machine guns and/or 20mm cannon in their aircraft. I would like to place some brief views on these subjects here. I did not want to clutter up the thread and digress with unrelated comments, but, of course, anyone is free to dive in here and share their own insights and views.

The Browning .50 caliber machine gun was developed after WW1 as a long range infantry weapon. In the 1930s, the US Army Air Corps (predecessor to the US Air Force) began using them in aircraft, valuing them for their increased range and hitting power over the .30 caliber machine guns then in use.

The Browning .50 caliber machine gun is so reliable a weapon that it is still in first line service with US troops to this day. This underlines the weapon's effectiveness, flexibility, and reliability. I have not shot a .50 personally, however, my brother, who had the opportunity to shoot them in Vietnam and also had ready access to a BAR assured me that it was quite possible to saw down a house with a .50.

The early US development of the .50 as a long range battlefield machine gun did anticipate certain situations earlier and more competently than other nations. The British and the Soviet Union stood pat with their .30 caliber machine guns, and the Germans, who had a slight edge with their 8mm caliber, pursued a different course for their infantry, basing the squad around a pair of light weight rapid fire MG 34 or MG 42 machine guns. This was ultimately proved to be the way to go regarding the infantry, but I'm concerned about aircraft in this post.

The Japanese and Italian forces were at the greatest disadvantage, because their military rifle rounds were 6.5mm caliber. Before the war, to get a harder hitting bullet with longer range, both nations introduced a larger ~.30 caliber round. Neither nation had fully equipped its forces with the new caliber weapons, but the point I make here is that for aircraft, the availability of a strong, hard hitting, long range heavy machine gun of unparalleled reliability was a big advantage.

For most national forces, the only direction for increased hitting power and range for aircraft beyond rifle caliber weapons was to use a 20mm cannon (or even larger). However, this upgrade path was not without its drawbacks. A 20mm cannon, regardless of the design used, is heavier than a machine gun, so fewer can be carried aboard an aircraft. Most 20mm cannon are slower firing than either .30 or .50 caliber machine guns. Some 20mm designs used a lower velocity round, somewhat like the 7.62x39 might be to the original full power 7.62x54r. A lack of velocity exacerbated aiming and hitting the target in fast moving aircraft, and diminished the range advantage the larger projectile offered.

Here, I'd like to make a note: The chief Japanese fighter used by the Navy and most often faced by Americans was the famous Mitsubishi Zero. There can be no doubt that the Zero was a very capable design, with tremendous maneuverability and great range. The Nakajima Sakae 1710 cubic inch radial engine had the peculiar ability to be run at very lean mixtures, which permitted the Zero to fly over 1000 miles without refueling, a distinct advantage over the wide Pacific battlefield. (Undoubtedly, this was due to a design which permitted superior fuel distribution between cylinders.)

The Zero's main competition at the beginning of the naval war was the F4F Wildcat. It was powered (in the early Grumman versions) by a Pratt & Whitney R-1830 radial. Perhaps the only radial engine to exceed the R1830 in reliability was the later R-2800 that powered the succeeding F6F Hellcat (and the Corsair and Thunderbolt, among other aircraft). However, the Wildcat was heavier, slower to climb, and less maneuverable.

The Zero had a pair of 20mm cannon, making it the only fighter that could competently deal with American heavy bombers like the B17 and B29 (rifle caliber bullets really couldn't bring down a Flying Fortress without a lot of luck), and a pair of 7.7mm machine guns.

The Wildcat had four .50 caliber machine guns.

While the Zero was a very light aircraft, it had no armor or self-sealing fuel tanks. The Wildcat had both, and was a very tough aircraft.

The problem here is the whole philosophy behind the Japanese method of waging war: They favored a small, highly trained group of warriors, samurai-like, to strike quick, hard, and decisive blows. The Zero was a samurai's weapon, made to dominate individual combat with other aircraft. The Japanese pilots were trained in a very offensively minded way. Most did not wear a parachute, considering the extra weight to be a hindrance to their aircraft's performance.

However, the days of aerial combat being a collection of individual dogfights had ended, even before WW1 was over. The new method was to dive, slash, and break away from combat. for this kind of fighting, something like the Messerschmidt Me109 was made to order, not the maneuverable Zero.

The Wildcat did take a pounding at the beginning of WW2, but it was not the "dog" some would have you to believe. Once the Americans began to analyze the Japanese equipment and tactics, they began to devise countermeasures, such as the "Thatch Weave." The capture of an almost intact Zero in the Aleutian Islands (part of the Battle of Midway) sealed the Japanese air effort's fate. The rebuilt Zero was recovered, rebuilt, flown, and analyzed by the Americans, who fed the data into the design for the Wildcat's successor, the F6F Hellcat.

Well before the war, the Americans had built two large radial engines, the Wright R-2600 and the Pratt & Whitney R-2800, of 1700 and 2000 hp, respectively. The Allison was a great design, but hampered by the deletion of turbochargers, which was part of the design intent. (Tungsten, a key element in high temperature turbine blades, was mostly available in Germany, and was a strategic material in the USA. Thus, turbochargers were usually allotted to bombers.) In the P38 Lightning, where the turbochargers were included, the performance was outstanding. In installations where they were deleted, high altitude performance was substandard. This was rectified by substituting Packard-built British Rolls Royce Merlins, most famously in the P51 Mustang.

The Japanese efforts to build successful large fighter engines was less successful, and while all of the fighter aircraft the US Army Air Force fielded in World War 2 were under development before Pearl Harbor (Corsair, Mustang, Hellcat, Lightning, Thunderbolt, etc.), the Japanese really didn't get serious about developing a fighter to match the new American fighters until it was too late.

The Germans had somewhat better fighter aircraft, and although the Me 109 was a very dated design by war's end, the Germans were able to update it more successfully than the Japanese. This is because they had powerplants (ultimately, the Daimler Benz DB 605) to furnish sufficient power. So, where the Japanese ran out of power with the Zero (the A6M5 variant had increased firepower to deal with the new Hellcat, but the added weight limited the Zero's speed, maneuverability, and climb), the Germans ran out of wing The 109 was a small aircraft, and only a few weapons were able to be mounted on it. In the end, the Germans resorted to larger caliber cannons, but a larger aircraft was really the answer.

Where the Japanese idea of war would be a quick, small strike by highly trained elites whose successes would cow the Americans into acquiescence of Japanese hegemony in the Western Pacific, the Germans bumbled around with internal politics and warfare, behavior which stifled the Fw190 and Me262 until it was too late. Essentially, the Germans had good ideas, technology, and engineering skills, but their leaders were not examples of the "master race" theories they propounded.

While technical issues certainly played a factor in the air war of WW2, I still feel this whole subject boils down to the same issue as simple hunting: The gun is a factor, maybe even a large one, but the main factor is who is behind the rifle pulling the trigger. The highly skilled Japanese and German aviators achieved spectacular successes and racked up incredible kill scores, but the individual performances were not the determining factor. Rather, the competent performances of large numbers of American aviators, who were trained by combat pilots who rotated back to prepare recruits for the aerial battlefield, proved to be the winning formula.

In essence, the Americans would have defeated Japan with Wildcats -- the cream of Japanese aviation went down at Midway, when the Wildcat was still the first line fighter. It would have been tougher and a longer road, but the entire Japanese situation was not prepared or able to deal with a long war of attrition. Their Admiral Yamamoto had warned of this before the decision was taken to attack West and South, rather than pursue a land war to the east and north. Anyone who objectively viewed the situation would have come to the same conclusion.

Excellent write up, Tim.I will add a few points, from what i remember.

In my opinion, the Japanese were crippled with rigid mindsets and a command which did not take risks nor pay heed to ground realities.For instance, two-thirds of the army was lost to disease and starvation.The Japanese did not send a third wave out at pearl harbor.This would have effectively crippled the American fleet.The commander refused to send the third wave citing the element of surprise was lost, and they had accomplished their objective.In reality, though the Japanese planes came under disciplined AA fire, there were hardly a dozen American planes in the Air.A third wave would have proved decisive.The Japanese also lost much of their Pacific fleet cheaply at Midway, and also to Bad luck, as in the case of the Yamamato.The inability of the Japanese to replace lost pilots with skilled men was also a decisive factor, with inexperienced men breaking formation to attack small destroyers instead of focusing on American Carriers.This lead to their own ships being vulnerable to torpedo attack.

The Allied Code-Breaking Expertise was also a major contributor to turning the tide.The Axis powers were too heavily engaged from all directions to adequately supply their forces.The Japanese took to Kamikaze, with fuel and supplies being provided for one way only.Their army ran low on medicine and ammunition, and men died from disease rather than battle.

The Germans made the tactical error, as did Napoleon before them, of attacking the Russians.The German army would eventually loose so much armor and men to the Russians it is considered the death blow to the Reich.Britain was on the verge of collapse, and was saved at the last moments during the Battle of Britain.As Timmy pointed out, a larger plane was the answer, the Germans had superior engines as well as pilots.Both Britain and Russia were able to supply just enough planes and armor respectively to beat the Germans into submission.

I would ask members to watch the following movies- Pearl Harbor, Letters from Iwo JIma,Enemy at the Gates,Downfall ( Der Untergung ) Saving Private Ryan and The Pianist ( Holocaust Movie ) Also the television series Band of Brothers and The Pacific.

They are some of the finest stories of the war ever told, especially the two TV series.

I consider the Landing on Omaha Beach in SPR the finest opening scene ever made.

For war movies, do not forget about Das Boot and The Battle of Britain. And watch Das Boot in german with subtitles on to get the best effect.

Skyman:

Going on with your thoughts...

[qupteThe Japanese did not send a third wave out at pearl harbor.This would have effectively crippled the American fleet.The commander refused to send the third wave citing the element of surprise was lost, and they had accomplished their objective.In reality, though the Japanese planes came under disciplined AA fire, there were hardly a dozen American planes in the Air.A third wave would have proved decisive.{/quote]

Mitsuo Fuchida, in his book, Midway, the Battle that Doomed Japan discusses what I think is the key here. Many people consider that Pearl Harbor was the bastion at the beginning of WW2 that it became by the end. This was not the case. President Roosevelt was putting pressure on the Japanese to cease their aggression in China by curtailing exports like oil and steel (the USA was the top exporter of oil in those days, and the Japanese war machine was totally dependent on American oil at the time) and by ordering the movement of the Pacific Fleet from its base at San Pedro, California to Pearl Harbor.

This was a bold move that was a clear threat to the Japanese, and also one which involved a risk to the Fleet. Admiral Richardson recognized this risk and protested, and for that reason he was sacked and replaced by Admiral Kimmel.

As the base at Pearl Harbor was developed to support the Pacific Fleet fully, a great deal of support facilities and a vital stockpile of oil were needed, and Fuchida later recognized (as he said in his book) that the oil tank farm at Pearl Harbor was the strategic resource that allowed the US Navy to project power from Hawaii, rather than the West Coast. Rufully, Fichida recognized the loss of this golden opportunity, for without a supply of oil, the Pacific Fleet would have been forced to retire to Southern California, greatly diminishing its ability to contest control of the Pacific and supply strategic partners, especially Australia.

It would have taken perhaps more than a year to recover from the loss of these oil supplies. The Japanese recognized the importance of destroying the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers. Actually, the day of the battleship had passed, and the loss of the eight battleships was not in any way decisive. When six of these ships returned to service, they provided a shore bombardment force, and a gun line protecting the beach at Leyte Gulf -- nothing more.

The US Navy had planned for war with Japan since well before WW1, with their "War Plan Orange," which was updated periodically and was pretty much followed during the course of the Pacific campaign. Originally, battleships with powerful armor and guns, but without great speed, were exactly what was called for to project power into the Western Pacific -- ships with great range and hitting power that could withstand great punishment, as well. Speed was not necessary, because the Japanese would have to come to the Pacific Fleet. However, by the mid to late 30s, the battleship was an outmoded factor in the Pacific theater and much (but not all) of the Atlantic, as well. The day after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese destroyed the old battlecruiser Repulse and the modern battleship Prince of Wales quite handily when the British sent them to oppose Japanese landings in Malaya.

In other words, the oil tank farms were more vital than those dinosaurs on Battleship Row!

The Allied Code-Breaking Expertise was also a major contributor to turning the tide.

and

The Japanese also lost much of their Pacific fleet cheaply at Midway, and also to Bad luck, as in the case of the Yamamato.

The Naval Intelligence community, which was keeping an eye on the Japanese, was fatally divided by bone headed politicians in uniform in Washington DC (the same bunch also insisted on keeping the defective torpedoes on US subs well into the war -- despite this, US subs waged a successful commerce war against Japan, where the Germans failed against the UK. Subs accounted for fully 5/8ths of the tonnage of Japanese ships. Had the submariners been able to overturn the Washington political admirals and get effective torpedoes early in the war, who knows how much sooner the Japanese would have been rolled up, if not defeated, in the Pacific.) and the Intelligence group of the Pacific Fleet.

Both groups dropped the ball at Pearl Harbor, but is was the Pacific Fleet Intelligence under Com. (later Captain) Joseph Rochefort and his group that provided the essential key to the Midway victory. There are few stories in modern warfare as the story of Midway!

The inability of the Japanese to replace lost pilots with skilled men was also a decisive factor, with inexperienced men breaking formation to attack small destroyers instead of focusing on American Carriers.This lead to their own ships being vulnerable to torpedo attack.

For sure! Japanese pilots were a very small elite group, intensively trained and, when war broke out, wasted with incredible profligacy. The Japanese had a much smaller of candidates with the proper educational background to draw from for their aviators, and they left them in the fray, more or less like the Germans, to be chewed up, where the Americans mobilized a vast training program with thousands of pilots and schooled them with combat pilots who rotated back to the training facilities.

Also, the US had "hotshot" fighters, like the F4U Corsair and the P38 Lightning available, but they focused on the F6F Hellcat, an aircraft with somewhat less performance, but one that could be competently flown by a much larger pool of pilots. The mass of good aircraft flown by good pilots with good training overwhelmed the Japanese, who, once their front line aviators were lost, had no way to replace them.

The Germans were in a somewhat similar position. Here, I'd note that they tried to make up their labor force with slave labor, and had to retain many skilled workers in key positions. In the USA, great numbers of women proved to be adept machinists, welders, assembly line workers, and even pilots. The USA, the UK, and the USSR were much more effective in mobilizing women than Germany and especially Japan was.

The Axis powers were too heavily engaged from all directions to adequately supply their forces.The Japanese took to Kamikaze, with fuel and supplies being provided for one way only.Their army ran low on medicine and ammunition, and men died from disease rather than battle.

Check out The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Paul Kennedy. While you may not agree totally with his economic theories of war and hegemony, one has to be amazed that Germany and Japan could begin to be nearly as successful as they were, and note that, like Yamamoto's prediction, both were essentially doomed after their initial successes ran their course. There was no way they could wage a successful war of attrition against the allies, anymore than the South could against the Union in the American Civil War.

Mark, those are great movies!

I'd also add, The Great Escape, The Bridge Over The River Kwai, Lawrence of Arabia, Zulu, and a favorite of mine, They Were Expendable.

Over the last few years, I have also been amazed at the quality of British war films, such as"

The Cruel Sea an excellent film with the excellent Jack Hawkins
The Man Who Never Was a great thriller based on a true story!
The Dam Busters if you like Lancasters, you'd better watch this one!
Sink the Bismarck! a great standard with lots of good actual naval footage
Reach for the Sky the amazing story of Douglas Bader, who flew as a paraplegic

A film that focuses on the domestic front that is an excellent movie, well worthy of the awards it received, is Mrs. Miniver

I just wanted to expand on the comments made by Tim and Skyman about the Japanese pilot training issue. Yes, the Japanese naval air effort was pretty much done after Midawy but they could still be a threat. However, after the "the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot", their stock of Naval aviation aircraft was severely depleted but they had no carrier trained pilots to fly what little was left. When Halsey went after their carriers during the Leyte landings, they were just decoys; empty ships with no planes. Meanwhile, by 1945, the US was producing 100,000 trained pilots a year.

WW2 was a war of logistics and industrial capacity. Once America entered the war, the result was a foregone conclusion (though it didn't appear so at the beginning). As Tim mentions, none of the Axis powers could fight a war of attrition with the US and win. Yamamoto tried to warn the powers that be in Japan about this. Unfortunately for them, being brought up and inculcated with a mindset that classed outsiders as subhuman, they refused to listen. Through their limited worldview, they could not conceive of a nation greater than Japan. In fact, the death threats that Yamamoto received (from the Japanese Army) due to his warnings, caused him to be sent to sea to save his life.

American factoiries retooled in a massive effort to produce war materiel. GM had closed it automobile lines and retooled, trained a new workforce and was producing Torpedo Bombers (Avenger TBM's) in large numbers. North American was producing P51's Mustang's at the rate of almost one an hour and across the bay from them, Grumman, often beat their production figures (in Hellcats). These were not isolated examples.; a Liberty ship (transatlantic cargo ship) took 12 days to build (from start to finish) and they weren't producing them one at a time either. The US started out with three carriers in the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. By the time Okinawa was invaded, there were about 80 carriers off the coast of the island. The Japanese had 10 aircraft carriers when the war started, by the time of the battle of Okinawa (early April until mid-June 1945), there were none that they could send against the allied invasion fleet.


Another example; a little railroad in Northern Minnesota moved an incredible amount of iron ore for use in wartime industries. This is a railroad that only had about a couple of hundred miles of trackage.

As the United States began to prepare for the Second World War the iron ore tonnage moving over the Missabe Road more than doubled from little over 8 million tons in 1938 to over 18 million tons in 1939 and leaped to almost 28 million tons in 1940 and over 37 million tons in 1941.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duluth,_Mi ... ge_Railway
This was just one railroad of the hundreds in the US at the time. Larger railroads hauled incredible tonnage in raw materials and finished goods.

By the end of the war, so overwhelming was US military superiority that attacks by the Axis forces could not even be called pin pricks. This was illustrated by the Japanese Naval operation "Ten-Go". The fleet that Japan sent to Okinawa to counter the US invasion fleet lasted mere hours and cost the US nothing in men and materiel to destroy.

Operation Ten-Go (Ten-gō sakusen) was the attempted attack by a strike force of Japanese surface vessels, led by the battleship Yamato and commanded by Adm. Seiichi Itō. This small task force had been ordered to fight through enemy naval forces, then beach themselves and fight from shore using their guns as coastal artillery and crewmen as naval infantry. The Ten-Go force was spotted by submarines shortly after it left the Japanese home waters, and was attacked by U.S. carrier aircraft.
Under attack from more than 300 aircraft over a two-hour span, the world's largest battleship sank on 7 April 1945, long before she could reach Okinawa. U.S. torpedo bombers were instructed to aim for only one side to prevent effective counter flooding by the battleship's crew, and hitting preferably the bow or stern, where armor was believed to be the thinnest. Of Yamato's screening force, the light cruiser Yahagi and four of the eight destroyers were also sunk. In all, the Imperial Japanese Navy lost some 3,700 sailors, including Itō, at the relatively low cost of just 10 U.S. aircraft and 12 airmen.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Okinawa

By the time massed fleets of B29 bombers appeared over Japan, they had neither the pilots, aircraft or the fuel to counter the bombers effectively. Once P51 Mustangs were able to escort the bombers, there was absolutely nothing the Japanese could do to stop the bombers. Of course, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed, there was no need to send any more bombers.


As an aside:

This underlines the weapon's effectiveness, flexibility, and reliability. I have not shot a .50 personally, however, my brother, who had the opportunity to shoot them in Vietnam and also had ready access to a BAR assured me that it was quite possible to saw down a house with a .50.

When I was at Ahlman's Customer Appreciation event, I asked the MG vendor how come they didn't have a Ma Duece for me to shoot and he said that the berm was not built well enough to handle a .50, considering the large number of people who would want to shoot it. The berm in question is about 30 feet high and about 40/50 feet deep at the base!

Great thoughts, Gents.Perhaps we should have a section on war history to discuss battles past.People of the west have access to museums,veteran stories etc which i would very much like to hear.We must also have a movie section, there are many good war movies that have been made and merit discussion.

Mark, i am surprised you did not chip in, you are quite the historian , and XL and Timmy, the both of you never fail to amaze me with your vast knowledge on almost any subject.

The ability of America to sustain production in may areas like skilled men,ordnance,ships,Sherman medium tanks etc was a key factor in the allied war effort.Not to forget, countries like Canada, Australia,New Zealand which supplied the allied effort as well. ( India also ).

I advocate a discussion from the BC battles to the present day in order, and a separate section for them.Battle with spear and sword fascinates me.

Skyman wrote:
Mark, i am surprised you did not chip in, you are quite the historian , and XL and Timmy, the both of you never fail to amaze me with your vast knowledge on almost any subject.

I'm rather busy at the moment getting ready for next weekend! If this thread is still alive after then I'll have quite a few comments.

Right now I have various other things to do. For example, yesterday I was using my bulldozer to push a tree trunk around at the village and disturbed a yellow jacket nest. (a type of wasp that makes large nests in the ground). I got stung 9 times and had 14 of them chase me all the way home while I was running, my #2 son and I had an exciting several minutes with flyswatters in the house.

I went back last night and took care of the nest but the stings are still a little sensitive, not enough to hurt but enough to complain about,

As you might suspect, I've had a more than casual interest in military aviation and have been truly fortunate to have had many friends in that world, especially WW2/Korea/Vietnam. Sadly most all are gone now.

Anyway, one last movie I can suggest is "Theirs is the Glory" about Operation Market Garden. Filmed in 1946 and using a lot of the original people who were in the actual operation. There is a link so you can even watch it on line for free:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theirs_Is_the_Glory

Has anyone here seen "Dark Blue World"? It is a Czech film that I have not seen but is supposed to have some of the best dogfighting movie footage ever filmed (which says a lot) but I've never seen the movie so I don't know, only what a couple of people have told me.

Mark, you must be in fine shape to be able to outrun wasps.They are as i recall, winged hell.I'll remind you next sunday to chip in.Hope you recover fully, and soon.

Thanks for the movies.

Well I've recovered, though it was interesting as today nothing is sore but half the stings itch like big mosquito bites. Took a hot shower this morning and will take another before bed, hopefully that will be the end of it.

Aloha,

Here is a great article about the fighter guns of the different combatants:

http://users.telenet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin ... un-pe.html

Besides having Higher horse power aircraft engines, the US invested heavily on

pilot survivability. Self sealing gas tanks and heavy armor protection for the pilot.

Leroy Grumman said, "the last place to Fail on a Grumman built aircraft is the cockpit".

Resulted in Grumman being know as "Grumman Iron Works"

The improved version of the Wldcat made by GM the FM-2 was a much more capable aircraft.

Robert S Johnson's P-47 was shot up by a FW-190 until it can out of ammo for Both it's machine guns

And 20mm cannon. The P-47 got him back to England.

Slightly OT, one reason the US ships and planes had high survivability was because the US invested in the

use of Special Treatment Steel, probably more so than other nations. The US had the capacity to make it

and made use of it everywhere they could.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Treatment_Steel

Here are a few P47 pictures you may find interesting, in terms of absorbing damage and still getting home:










Posting this one simply because the pilot was a good friend:

The "jug" was a very tough aircraft. With 8 50 cal machine guns, they could "take apart" whatever they could hit. But I will note this: Look at the fighters powered by the fantastic Pratt & Whitney R2800: There was the P47 Thunderbolt, The F4U Corsair, and the the F6F Hellcat. Think about it: all three of these aircraft were known for their toughness. Also, I would note that the Douglas DC6 Commercial Transport was the most cost-effective piston engined transport ever, due mainly to the great reliability of the R2800 engines. No big piston engine before or since was quite like the amazing R2800.

On one other note, the P47 was the fastest US fighter (P47M). Also, the P47 had great high altitude performance, as did the only other US fighter to be equipped with turbochargers, the P38 Lightning.

Good points Timmy!

Another great post Timmy. Thank you, and Mark, and XL, for taking the discussion further..

As I was going through this - this has happened several times in the past - it struck me that someday many of these posts will have great archival value (in fact they already have) and one/some of us should save these pages for posterity. Maybe someday someone may even think of editing and publishing the best posts from IFG.


TC